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In this issue of Neuron, Clapcote et al. examine mice containing missense mutations of the DISC1
gene, a locus associated with major mental illness in at least one large Scottish family. Genetic
manipulation of mouse homologs of genes implicated in the etiology of psychiatric disorders is
a promising avenue of research, but also one that is fraught with interpretative difficulties.A major theme in neuroscience and
neuropsychiatric research has been
the identification of mutant genes
leading to neurologic diseases fol-
lowed by the subsequent creation of
animal, frequently mouse, models of
these diseases through genetic ma-
nipulation. The rationale behind this re-
search approach is that these models
will provide insight into the underlying
biology of the human disease and offer
a test bed for the development of ther-
apies for that disease. From the outset,
as a community, we need to acknowl-
edge that, so far, no therapies for any
neuropsychiatric disease have been
developed by these means. And al-
though we believe we have gained fur-
ther understanding about the diseases
through studying them this way, in the
absence of therapies for the human
conditions, this derived knowledge
has not been rigorously tested. Un-
doubtedly, even for the Mendelian dis-
ease variants for which this approach
has been most extensively applied,
such as Huntington’s and Alzheimer’s
diseases, the animal models that
have been developed only partially
mimic the human condition (Bates
and Hockly 2003; Duff and Suleman
2004), and the description of these
models as ‘‘Huntington’s mice’’ or
‘‘Alzheimer’s mice’’ in both the scien-
tific and popular literature has been
a disservice to unraveling the com-
plexity of the problem. However, at
least in these conditions the relevance
of the models has two anchors: the
certainty of Mendelian inheritance
and the pathologic similarity of the348 Neuron 54, May 3, 2007 ª2007 Elsevmodels to the human disease; and
this perhaps bodes well for their future
utility in treatment research.
In addressing the major psychiatric
syndromes, such as mood disorders
and psychoses, additional problems
for research are present. They are
uniquely human conditions; they ap-
pear to represent extremes of the
normal spectrum of human behavior;
they have no defining pathology; and,
while frequently familial, they usually
do not exhibit Mendelian patterns of
inheritance.
The use of mouse models in psychi-
atry has been and will always be lim-
ited to examining a specific dimen-
sion of the psychiatric disorder (Einat,
2007; Tordjman et al., 2007), rather
than being able to test the disease en-
tity as a whole. Because psychiatric
disorders are composed of lists of
symptoms,many of which are nonspe-
cific and overlap with those of other
psychiatric disorders, a mouse model
may be able to mimic some observ-
able behaviors, but the attribution of
a specific behavior to a human emo-
tion or cognitive state cannot be
made. Reasons for a psychiatric pa-
tient’s behavior—for example, lack of
participation in regular, pleasurable
activities—can be interpreted in multi-
ple ways by an observer, including
avoidance due to anxiety, paranoid
delusions, low mood, or loss of moti-
vation. Discerning the reasons for the
uncharacteristic behavior depends on
a reliable and objective reporter, yet
impaired judgment and reasoning and
denial are also symptoms of psychi-ier Inc.atric disorders, making the true in-
ternal states of a patient evenmore dif-
ficult to know. These already difficult
considerations in human assessments
can never be applied to the analysis of
mouse models of psychiatric illness.
What is helpful is when mouse mod-
elers describe, as Clapcote and col-
leagues do herein with DISC1 variants
(Clapcote et al., 2007), the observable
behavior being depicted (for example,
excess motoric acivitity) rather than
generalizing it to a specific psychiatric
disorder (for example, schizophrenia).
That behavior, in fact, may be ob-
served in many psychiatric disorders
(excess motoric behavior in bipolar
disorder, autism, attention-deficit hy-
peractivity disorder as examples), and
in such cases this feature would not
define a specific etiology of disease
or a future therapy.
Molecular genetic analyses of the
major psychiatric syndromes have not
yet yielded risk loci that are universally
accepted (DeLisi and Faraone, 2006).
However, in an interesting and large
Scottish family, a balanced transloca-
tion at 1q42 segregates significantly,
but not perfectly, with a high incidence
of affective disorders and schizophre-
nia (Blackwood et al., 2001). This
balanced translocation disrupts two
genes, named Disrupted In Schizo-
phrenia 1 (DISC1) and DISC2 (Millar
et al., 2000). DISC2 appears to be an
antisense transcript involved in the
regulation of DISC1 expression. While
DISC1’s function is not known, it is
a large, brain-expressed cytoplasmic
protein that is believed to interact with
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ing phosphodiesterase 4 (PDE4B),
whose cAMP hydrolyzing activity it is
believed to modulate.
The evidence tying the disruption,
and thus haploinsufficiency, of DISC1
to the psychiatric symptoms in the
family is reasonably convincing, al-
though it is difficult formally to rule
out longer-range genetic effects of
the translocation or the possibility
of a chance association, especially in
the context of documented nonpene-
trance in the family. The possibility of
a chance association would be ruled
out unequivocally by the identification
and characterization of other families
with DISC1 mutations. The genetic
evidence tying the DISC locus to
mood disorders and psychosis in the
general population, while generally
positive (Muir et al., 2006), is less con-
vincing and may be confounded by
publication bias.
With this background, Clapcote
et al. (2007) have identified and char-
acterized threemouse DISC1mutants:
two missense variants created by the
ENU chemical mutagenesis program
(Coghill et al., 2002) and one naturally
occurring, out-of-frame deletion close
to the C terminus of the protein (Clap-
cote and Roder, 2006). The missense
lines were biochemically and behav-
iorally assessed in both heterozygote
and homozygote states. The missense
mutations had no discernable effects
on the protein levels, and the C-termi-
nal deletion was reported, in other ex-
periments (Ishizuka et al., 2007), to
only affect one splice isoform of the
protein. One of the missense muta-
tions, Q31L, appeared to be associ-
ated with reduced PDE4B activity
and to lead to a smaller brain volume,
decreased latent inhibition, decreased
sociability, and prolonged forced swim
immobility. These behavioral features
are reminiscent, given the caveats dis-
cussed above, of the impaired pro-
cessing, anhedonia, and depression
seen in the psychotic and mood disor-
ders. Furthermore, these features par-tially responded to haloperidol and
clozapine (well-established treatments
for schizophrenia and other forms
of psychoses) and bupropion (used
mainly for depression and smoking
cessation). The other missense muta-
tion, L100P, also had a reduction in
brain volume, but this was not associ-
ated with a reduction in PDE4B activ-
ity. This mutation was associated
with deficits in latent and prepulse inhi-
bition and with an increase in horizon-
tal activity. The deficit in prepulse inhi-
bition was reversed by the PDE4
inhibitor, rolipram, which has been ex-
amined in a few small trials as an anti-
depressant, but not pursued due to
intolerable side effects (Berton and
Nestler, 2006).
These data are generally consistent
with the view that genetic modification
of the DISC1 locus leads to behavioral
outcomes that may correspond to
traits or abnormalities observed in psy-
chiatric disorders. However, clearly, it
behooves us to be cautious in their in-
terpretation. In addition to the above
caveats inherent in modeling psychi-
atric disorders, the two observations
that the mutations (1) have different
and complex biochemical, anatomical,
and behavioral effects; and (2) are
missense and essentially recessive in
effect, rather than destructive and es-
sentially dominant with incomplete
penetrance (as in the Scottish family),
favor a conservative interpretation
especially since the prevalent mouse
DISC1 deletion variant has, at most,
subtle behavioral effects even when
homozygote. In addition, it would be
helpful for us to have a more compre-
hensive description of the clinical pro-
file, phenomenology, and treatment
response of the original family to form
a basis of comparison for these intrigu-
ing animal experiments.
Psychiatric illnesses are highly prev-
alent, devastating to the affected indi-
viduals and their families, and enor-
mously costly to society. We have
a pressing obligation to better under-
stand their etiology and develop strat-Neuron 5egies to reduce their incidence and im-
prove their course and severity. Mouse
models, such as these, may be a way
forward, but we must use them cau-
tiously and be wary not to only study
mice and to lose sight of the human
condition. It should further humble us
to realize that our current therapies
for these disorders have been discov-
ered serendipitously and through de-
velopment of these initial happy
accidents.
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